Three laboratory experiments and a field experiment in a restaurant demonstrate that neither a price surcharge nor an unhealthy label is enough on its own to curtail the demand for unhealthy food. However, when the two are combined as an unhealthy label surcharge, they reduce demand for unhealthy food. The authors also show that the unhealthy label is as effective for women as the unhealthy label surcharge, whereas it backfires for men, who order more unhealthy food when there is an unhealthy label alone. The authors demonstrate that an unhealthy surcharge, which highlights both the financial disincentive and potential health costs, can significantly drive healthier consumption choices. From a policy and government perspective, if the goal is to reduce demand for unhealthy food, increasing the transparency of the health rationale for any financial disincentive is necessary to effectively lower unhealthy food consumption.
Many countries are facing an obesity epidemic. In the United States, for example, obesity rates have more than doubled in the past two decades, with a prevalence rate greater than 20% (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2012) . Although obesity is a multifactorial disease, increased consumption of unhealthy food and beverages is a major driver of the epidemic (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2012). Experts contend that large-scale interventions are necessary to dissuade people from consuming unhealthy food (Ubel 2009 ), particularly in restaurant settings, where people are consuming an increasing proportion of their calories (University of Rochester Medical Center 2013; Young and Nestle 2002) . Food eaten outside the home accounted for 34% of the food budget in 1970; by the late 1990s, it had increased to 47%, and this number is still growing (Clauson 1999; Dumagan and Hackett 1995) . As a result, experts have proposed initiatives to attenuate unhealthy choices at restaurants.
Some government policies have attempted to eliminate unhealthy choices by banning unhealthy ingredients and foods such as trans fats and large, sugary beverages (National Conference of State Legislatures 2013). Other policy suggestions have focused on gentler nudges to improve food choices, such as adding more extensive nutrition labeling on food packaging (e.g., Burton et al. 2006; Chandon and Wansink 2007) . Between the bans and nudges lie two other promising approaches to reducing unhealthy food consumption: (1) applying surcharges-or "sin taxes"-on less healthy foods or ingredients and (2) attaching unhealthy labels to food choices.
In this article, we consider the effectiveness of the combination of a surcharge and unhealthy label on the demand for less-healthy menu items. Using experimental and field evidence, we contend that the best approach to curtail unhealthy food consumption is to use both an unhealthy label and a surcharge to unhealthy menu items (we call this combination an "unhealthy surcharge").
SURCHARGES, UNHEALTHY LABELS, AND FOOD CHOICE Surcharges
Excise taxes have been most commonly added to tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, horse racing, and gasoline; thus, economists and policy makers have labeled them "sin taxes" (Hines 2007) . Surcharges, sin taxes, and excise taxes more generally have been charged to particular items when they are made, transported, sold, and consumed. Sin taxes are intended to influence people's behavior through traditional economic mechanisms, with the higher price designed to reduce demand. In economics, the prevailing belief is that the disutility of a surcharge is due strictly to the monetary costs imposed on the consumer (e.g., Ramsey 1927) . There is some evidence that imposing a surcharge can reduce unhealthy consumption. For example, when gasoline prices increase, many consumers switch from higher-to lowergrade gasoline (Hastings and Shapiro 2013) . Sin taxes on cigarettes have been cited as one of the major drivers of substantially reduced smoking rates, though results have been mixed (Chaloupka and Warner 2000) . Furthermore, a fivecent shopping bag fee decreased the fraction of customers using disposable bags in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area (Homonoff 2013 ). In addition, price increases in gasoline have led consumers to substitute more fuel-efficient vehicles and automakers to manufacture new vehicles with better fuel economy (Burke and Nishitateno 2013) .
Implementation of a surcharge on unhealthy food has been gaining momentum. In 2011, Denmark introduced the world's first tax specifically for unhealthy food in the form of a value-added tax targeting foods high in saturated fats. Although Denmark abolished the tax in November 2012, other countries (e.g., Canada, France) have since tried the approach. In 2014, Mexico imposed an unhealthy food tax by increasing the price of junk foods by 8% (Boseley 2013) . Other countries, including the United States, are now considering taxes on fat or sugar. In February 2014, Illinois proposed the Healthy Eating Active Living Act, which, if passed, would add a one-cent per ounce excise tax on the purchase price of soda, energy drinks, and other sugarsweetened drinks, syrups, and drink powders (Bernhard 2014) . The effect of these programs remains to be seen.
Will surcharges on unhealthy foods work as well as these other sin taxes? In contrast to other types of sin taxes, such as gasoline, cigarettes, and shopping bags, a tax for lesshealthy food may not function in a straightforward economic manner. For example, people may believe that higher-quality foods cost more or are more special, thereby increasing the demand for unhealthy meals that have been taxed (Drewnowski 2010; Monroe 1973; Olson 1977) . In addition, some people may perceive the higher price to be a sign of healthiness or freshness rather than as a surcharge on unhealthy items. As a result, taxing unhealthy foods without explicitly informing people that an unhealthy surcharge has been imposed may backfire. Finally, another possible response to a surcharge or sin tax is reactance. People may respond to the surcharge by choosing the opposite behavior to that intended in an effort to reestablish perceived limitations of freedom (Kirchler 1998) .
The effect of sin taxes may also differ by gender. Price increases may have a stronger effect on men than women (e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund [2001] find that men are more responsive to price changes in the dictator game). Observational research has been consistent with these findings, noting that men spend less money per shopping trip than women and have been spending more money at discount stores over the past decade (Hale 2011) .
In addition, in some social settings, such as at a restaurant, ordering expensive meals can send a positive social signal of wealth or generosity (Dietler 1996) . Although research has found that men are more price conscious than women, gender differences in spending may be based on the social context of the purchase situation. For example, women tend to prefer men who are wealthy, of high status, and who are resource rich (Hudson and Henze 1969; Nelson and Morrison 2005; Sadalla, Kenrick, and Vershure 1987) . As a result, men have a tendency to increase spending and save less as a means of displaying economic power not only when they are with women but also when they are with mating competition (i.e., in the presence of other men; Hopcroft 2006). Thus, men eating either in a dating context or with other men may purchase more expensive items than if they were eating alone.
Unhealthy Labels
Researchers have argued that providing calorie and fat information, or some other signal of healthiness, for each item would enable consumers to make more-educated decisions. However, calorie count information is often difficult for people to interpret (Elbel et al. 2009 ). One reason for this is that calorie information exists on a continuum, making it difficult for people to determine when the calorie content of a meal transitions from healthy to unhealthy. More recently, Parker and Lehmann (2014) find that although calorie posting can lead to healthier choices in some instances, menus that organize dishes by calories increase unhealthy choices, demonstrating the nuanced effectiveness that calorie posting may have. Consequently, consumer researchers and public health educators have championed labels that designate meals as "unhealthy." However, evidence on the effect of unhealthy labels is equivocal (e.g., Viswanathan and Hastak 2002; Wansink and Chandon 2006 ; for a review on the effectiveness of nutrition labels, see Chandon and Wansink 2012) . In the absence of calorie information or unhealthy labels, people sometimes use product category heuristics to form inferences about the healthiness of a particular choice (Sujan 1985; Sujan and Dekleva 1987) . For example, some items in an otherwise healthy category, such as the Cheesecake Factory's Grilled Chicken Caesar Salad, have very high calorie and fat counts (1,510 calories and 16 grams of saturated fat [see www. calorielab.com]) but are perceived to be healthy because they are in a prototypically healthy category. An unhealthy label may override these product category heuristics, helping people make more informed decisions.
Similar to price surcharges, unhealthy labels may have complex effects. People may use food labels to signal identities they would like to portray (Barker, Tandy, and Stookey 1999; Steim and Nemeroff 1995) . Importantly, those desired identities might differ by gender. Gender stereotypes can significantly affect the preference for healthy foods. Preferring healthier foods is rated as more feminine and less masculine (Steim and Nemeroff 1995) . Women are regarded as more attractive when eating fewer calories (Barker, Tandy, and Stookey 1999) . However, unhealthy labels might backfire for men, for whom eating high-fat foods is associated with masculinity, whereas healthy eating is perceived as wimpy and less masculine. White and Dahl (2006) demonstrate that men are less inclined to choose products associated with women and that this effect is magnified in public settings. Therefore, an unhealthy label may actually encourage men to choose these marked items, particularly if they are eating with others.
The selection of unhealthy food may also reflect a temporary goal state. For example, unhealthy products are preferred when a hedonic goal is salient (Raghunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer 2006) . Because unhealthy products are often perceived as tastier, people believe that if they work hard, they earn the right to indulge (Kivetz and Simonson 2002) . Thus, an unhealthy label may be construed as a sign of indulgence and may encourage consumption. Together, these studies indicate that unhealthy labels may reduce demand for unhealthy menu items because the labels are clearer than calorie information and contain an avoidant identity signal (e.g., for women) or may increase demand for unhealthy food if the dining experience goal is indulgent or the identity signal favors unhealthy consumption (e.g., for men).
Combining a Surcharge with an Unhealthy Label (Unhealthy Surcharge)
We argue that despite the issues involved in implementing either a price surcharge or unhealthy label alone, combining a price increase with an explicit unhealthy label can reduce the demand for unhealthy food compared with either intervention used separately. For example, this combined approach would reduce the chance that people perceive the higher price of unhealthy foods as a signal of quality because they would be informed that the higher price results from an unhealthy surcharge. In addition, an unhealthy surcharge may activate avoidance of unhealthy food because the reason for the price is explicitly linked to the unhealthy nature of the food. People avoid price increases framed as a tax significantly more than equal-sized or larger monetary costs that are unrelated to taxes, a phenomenon known as "tax aversion" (Sussman and Olivola 2011) . The cultural, political, and even moral costs associated with a tax extend past the avoidance of a particular financial loss (Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber 2010; Kirchler 1998) . People perceive taxes as representing a loss of financial freedom, unfair treatment, and the government restricting individual liberty (Kirchler 1998) . Sussman and Olivola (2011) note that people are more willing to incur costs such as traveling farther or waiting in line to avoid a tax, which is not the case for a monetary cost unrelated to a tax. Gender may also influence attitudes toward taxes: men are less conforming and compliant with taxes than women (Kastlunger et al. 2010; Porcano 1988) .
A targeted tax on unhealthy food may influence perceptions of fairness of the price of unhealthy items relative to the price of healthy items. This can reduce demand for these unhealthy items in part because consumers want to avoid paying the unfair price. We predict that consumers will decrease demand for unhealthy food when an unhealthy surcharge is used in combination with the information that a price increase has been applied because the item is unhealthy.
As we have outlined, we also believe that there will be significant gender effects. We hypothesize that men will be more sensitive to price increases when dining alone but that a price increase may not decrease unhealthy food consumption for men if they are dining with others. We also expect that an unhealthy label alone may backfire for men. For women, we expect that an unhealthy label will be more potent than a price surcharge. However, we expect the combined effect of a price surcharge and an unhealthy label (i.e., an "unhealthy surcharge") to be effective in reducing choice of unhealthy food for both men and women. For men, framing the price increase as being due to the unhealthy nature of the food will lead to more avoidance of unhealthy foods, whereas for women the unhealthy label alone will still be effective. These gender differences in the reasons for the success of the unhealthy surcharge imply that there may also be some gender differences in mediators. We hypothesize that perceptions of price fairness for unhealthy items relative to healthy items will be an important mediator of the unhealthy surcharge effect for men. For women, we expect that perceptions of the healthiness of the unhealthy food items relative to the healthy items will also play a role in mediating the effect.
EXPERIMENT 1A: EFFECTIVENESS OF SURCHARGES AND UNHEALTHY LABELS ON UNHEALTHY FOOD DEMAND
In Experiment 1a, we test the hypothesis that consumers will be less likely to choose unhealthy items with an unhealthy surcharge compared with unhealthy food that has a surcharge, unhealthy label alone, or neither (control). Economists and public health researchers have argued that a 2.9%-17.5% sin tax is necessary to deter behavior (Blake 2003; Jacobsen and Brownell 2000) , so we added a 17.5% surcharge on unhealthy foods because this surcharge amount represents the strongest manipulation. We also test whether gender moderates the effectiveness of a surcharge, unhealthy label, or unhealthy surcharge on unhealthy food demand.
In addition, we explore the underlying psychological processes behind the effectiveness of a combined intervention. We hypothesized that differences in perceptions of price fairness and food healthiness between healthy and unhealthy items would mediate the effect of an unhealthy surcharge on reducing the demand for unhealthy food. By making it transparent that the price had been increased because the item was less healthy, we predicted that participants would perceive the price of unhealthy items to be unfair relative to the healthy items (i.e., the difference in fair price perceptions between healthy and unhealthy items), reducing their likelihood of choosing an unhealthy entrée item.
Participants
We recruited paid volunteers located across the United States using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk online surveysampling site (N = 1,200; 61.8% female) . In this study, all participants were over the age of 18 years and were citizens of and resided within the United States.
Procedure and Materials
All participants were presented with a hypothetical menu. All menus contained six choices (three food categories: chicken, seafood, and beef, with unhealthy and healthy choices within each category) taken from popular chain restaurants. Each of the healthy items was less than 650 calories, while unhealthy items were all more than 1,200 calories, although this information was not disclosed to participants. Participants received one of four menus:
•The no intervention menu, which served as the control group (see Appendix A); •The surcharge menu, which included a 17.5% price increase on the three most unhealthy entrées (one from each food category), but no explicit mention of the increase; •The unhealthy label menu, which included an asterisk next to each unhealthy entrée and an explanation at the bottom of the menu that the item was marked as unhealthy for exceeding values for fat and/or sugar content; and •The unhealthy surcharge menu, which included both a 17.5% surcharge and an asterisk next to each unhealthy entrée together with an explanation at the bottom of the menu that the surcharge was due to the item exceeding values for fat and/or sugar content.
The healthy entrées were the same price in all three menus. All participants saw the exact same menu items, pictures, and descriptions. After viewing the entire menu, participants were instructed to choose only one entrée.
After participants made their entrée choice, they rated how fair the price was for each menu item on a five-point Likert scale ("Please rate how fair you think the menu price is"; 1 = "Completely unfair," 3 = "Neither fair nor unfair," and 5 = "Very fair"). Participants also rated perceived tastiness, indulgence, and healthiness for each item. Because tastiness and indulgence ratings did not satisfy the tests for mediation in any of the laboratory experiments, we do not mention them further. We examine price fairness and healthiness perceptions when considering gender differences in mediation in the following subsections.
Results
Surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge. Figure 1 and Table 1 present the proportion of participants ordering an unhealthy meal as a function of the menu type. We used a logistic regression analysis, regressing the menu conditions (surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge) on the proportion of people who ordered an unhealthy entrée. The overall model was significant (c 2 (3) = 48.83, p < .001). The analysis shows that, compared with the no intervention menu, adding a surcharge to unhealthy items did not significantly reduce the proportion of unhealthy entrées chosen. An unhealthy label significantly reduced the demand for unhealthy food compared with the no intervention menu, as did the unhealthy surcharge condition. Adding an unhealthy surcharge resulted in a 40.3% decrease in demand for unhealthy items compared with the no intervention menu (from 42.2% to 25.2%), whereas adding an unhealthy label resulted in a 26.3% decrease in demand for unhealthy food (from 42.2% to 33.3%).
Using a z-test for proportions, we probed the effectiveness of the menu conditions relative to one another. The unhealthy surcharge intervention significantly decreased demand for unhealthy food compared with just using a surcharge (z = -2.82, p = .005) or an unhealthy label (z = -2.18, p = .03). All other comparisons were not significant (z < 1).
The role of gender. Figure 2 presents the mean proportion of participants who ordered an unhealthy meal as a function of gender and menu condition. We used a logistic regression analysis, regressing the menu conditions (surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge), gender, and their two-way interaction on the proportion ordering an unhealthy entrée. The overall model was significant (c 2 (7) = 70.24, p <
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JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2014 .001). Although the main effect of gender was not significant, there was a significant interaction between gender and surcharge and between gender and unhealthy surcharge (surcharge: Wald c 2 (1) = 7.84, p = .005; unhealthy surcharge: Wald c 2 (1) = 3.67, p = .056). Men significantly reduced unhealthy food choice when a simple surcharge was added to unhealthy items compared with women and compared with no intervention. Compared with the no intervention condition, both men and women significantly decreased unhealthy food choice when an unhealthy surcharge was added, with women reducing demand significantly more than men. Finally, compared with no intervention, women significantly reduced unhealthy food choice when just a label was added to unhealthy items. Mediation. Given these gender differences and our expectation that price perceptions may play a greater role for men, with healthiness perceptions playing a greater role for women, we performed separate mediation analyses for men and women. To capture relative price fairness perceptions, we took the difference between the average fairness measures for healthy and unhealthy items to create one overall price fairness index measure. 1 Higher scores represented a higher perceived inequity between how fair the price was between healthy and unhealthy items, with positive scores indicating that the price of unhealthy goods was perceived to be less fair than that for healthy goods. We performed the same calculations on the healthiness ratings to create a relative healthiness index. Similar to the fairness index, higher scores represented a higher perceived difference between healthiness perceptions of healthy and unhealthy items, with positive scores indicating that the healthiness rating of healthy goods was perceived to be higher than for unhealthy goods.
Using McKinnon and Dwyer (1993) , Kenny (2013) , and Herr's (2013) SPSS process macro for mediation with dichotomous outcome variables, we tested whether perception of price fairness and/or perception of food healthiness mediate the relationship between the unhealthy surcharge and demand for unhealthy food. For men, price fairness and healthiness perceptions partially mediated the effect of unhealthy surcharge; for women, price fairness was not a significant mediator, but healthiness perceptions partially mediated the effect (for details, see the Web Appendix).
Discussion of Experiment 1a
For hypothetical menu choices, an unhealthy surcharge was the most effective intervention overall for reducing demand for unhealthy food. Relative to no intervention, increasing price alone reduced unhealthy food choice for men but not women, whereas an unhealthy label alone reduced unhealthy food choice for women but not men. Attaching a surcharge and attributing it to unhealthy consumption was significantly more effective than no intervention for both genders.
EXPERIMENT 1B: THE IMPACT OF CALORIE INFORMATION Procedure and Materials
Experiment 1b had a 2 (calorie and health information: included or not included) ¥ 3 (menu condition: no intervention, surcharge menu, or unhealthy surcharge menu) between-subjects design. We presented participants (N = 894; 59.6% female) with the same six menu items from Experiment 1a. However, half the participants were given the calorie and saturated fat information for each dish, while the other half were not. Because the unhealthy label did not decrease demand for unhealthy food among men, we sought another information intervention that might persuade both men and women. After choosing an entrée, participants rated price fairness and food healthiness perceptions. Table 2 presents the results. Consistent with prior work on the effectiveness of including calorie information (Elbel et al. 2009 ), providing calorie and fat information did not significantly affect demand (p = .516). As we predicted, there was a significant interaction between gender and surcharge (Wald c 2 (1) = 8.73, p = .003). Replicating the effect we found in Experiment 1a, men significantly reduced unhealthy food choice more than women when just a surcharge was added to unhealthy foods (z = -4.04, p < .001) compared with men in the no intervention condition (z = -3.24, p = .001). More importantly, adding an unhealthy surcharge significantly reduced unhealthy food choice compared with the no intervention condition, regardless of gender or whether calorie information was present (Wald c 2 (1) = 14.6, p < .001). The unhealthy surcharge condition also significantly reduced unhealthy food choice relative to the surcharge condition (z = -2.60, p = .009). Finally, the surcharge condition was not different from the no intervention menu (z = -1.25, p = .211). Using the same macro as Experiment 1a, we performed separate mediation analyses for men and women. For men, price fairness fully mediated the effects; for women, price fairness is a partial mediator; when both healthiness and price fairness perceptions are used, there is full mediation (for details and analyses, see the Web Appendix).
Results

Discussion of Experiment 1b
We have shown that adding an unhealthy surcharge significantly reduced the demand for unhealthy food compared with a surcharge, unhealthy label, calorie and fat information, or no intervention at all. In addition, we provide evidence regarding the psychological mechanism. In both Experiments 1a and 1b, price fairness plays an important role for men in mediating the effects, whereas for women, healthiness perceptions also play an important role.
EXPERIMENT 2: EATING ALONE VERSUS EATING WITH A FRIEND
To assess the robustness of our effects, in Experiment 2 we test the effect of imagining eating alone versus eating with a same-sex friend across menu conditions. Prior research has demonstrated that people are less inclined to choose products associated with undesirable associations (see White and Dahl 2006) . Thus, we examine whether the demand for unhealthy choice is altered in public versus private settings. We made participants' gender salient by explicitly asking their gender and explored whether gender moderated results across the menu and dining partner conditions.
Participants
We recruited volunteers using the same methods as the first experiment (N = 1,987; 50.0% female). Similar to the first experiment, participants were presented with one of the menus and instructed to choose an entrée as well as to indicate how they made their decision and how they rated the entrées on various attributes.
Procedure and Materials
Experiment 2 had a 2 (dining partner: alone or with samesex friend) ¥ 4 (menu condition: no intervention, surcharge menu, unhealthy label menu, unhealthy surcharge menu) between-subjects design. To make gender salient, we first asked all participants to indicate their gender. In the dining alone condition, participants were told that they would be going alone to a new restaurant that had opened in town. In the dining with the same-sex friend condition, we asked participants to write down the first name of their best friend of the same sex (who was not a romantic interest). We limited the condition in this manner in an effort to control for any potential issues that might arise when having dinner with a romantic interest. We told participants to imagine they would be going with this friend to a new restaurant.
Participants received one of the four menus used in Experiment 1a because calorie information did not have an effect either as a main effect or when interacted with gender in Experiment 1b. Participants were asked to choose which entrée they preferred and again rated price fairness and healthiness. In addition, we asked participants to answer a six-item gender identity and food stereotypes scale that we developed for this study ( Being conscious of what you eat is not manly"; seven-point Likert scale, 1 = "strongly disagree," and 7 = "strongly agree"; Cronbach's alpha = .81). Participants also completed the price consciousness scale (Lichtenstein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 1993) and the Anti-Fat Attitudes scale (Crandall 1994 ; for details, see the Web Appendix); however, these data did not affect the results (p > .14) and are not mentioned further.
Results
Unhealthy entrée choice. Figure 3 and Table 3 present the percentage of participants who selected an unhealthy item as a function of menu condition and dining partner. We examined the effect of dining partner (i.e., whether participants were told that they were dining alone or with a samesex platonic friend) as well as each menu intervention on the proportion of unhealthy dishes ordered. We used a logistic regression analysis, regressing the main effects of surcharge, unhealthy label, unhealthy surcharge, dining partner, and the two-way interactions between dining partner and the three menu conditions on the proportion ordering an unhealthy entrée. The overall model was significant (c 2 (7) = 37.85, p < .001). The analysis showed that, compared with the no intervention menu, adding a surcharge or unhealthy label did not significantly reduce the proportion of unhealthy
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JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2014 entrées chosen (p > .16). As we predicted, an unhealthy surcharge significantly reduced demand for unhealthy items compared with the no intervention menu (Wald c 2 (1) = 8.49, p = .004). Overall, adding an unhealthy surcharge resulted in a 37.3% decrease in demand for unhealthy products compared with the no intervention menu (proportion ordering an unhealthy entrée item reduced from 47.2% to 29.6%). We used a z-test for proportions to further probe the relationship between the menu interventions to determine the effectiveness of each intervention compared with the others. The unhealthy surcharge menu significantly decreased demand for unhealthy food more than the surcharge menu (z = -4.90, p < .001), replicating the pattern observed in Experiments 1a and 1b. Compared with an unhealthy label, an unhealthy surcharge also significantly decreased the proportion who chose an unhealthy entrée (z = -3.51, p < .001). The unhealthy surcharge reduced demand by 33.6% compared with the surcharge alone (proportion ordering an unhealthy entrée item reduced from 44.6%% to 29.6%) and by 26.4% compared with the unhealthy label alone (proportion ordering an unhealthy entrée item reduced from 40.2% to 29.6%). Neither an unhealthy label alone nor dining with a same-sex friend significantly influenced the proportion of participants who ordered an unhealthy entrée as a main effect (p > .16). Next, we examine whether gender moderates our results.
The role of gender. Figure 4 presents the percentage of participants who selected an unhealthy item as a function of menu condition and dining partner, split by gender. In an effort to explore whether gender moderated the effectiveness of the menu interventions, we used a logistic regression analysis, regressing surcharge, unhealthy label, unhealthy surcharge, gender, and the two-way interactions between gender and the three menu conditions on the proportion of participants who ordered an unhealthy entrée. The overall model was significant (c 2 (7) = 52.40, p < .001, adjusted R 2 = .026). Although the main effect of gender alone was not significant (Wald c 2 (1) = .904, p = .342), in this experiment the two-way interaction between gender and the unhealthy label intervention was significant (Wald c 2 (1) = 10.65, p = .001). The unhealthy label condition had a different effect on the demand for unhealthy food for men and women: men were more likely to order an unhealthy entrée than women when just an unhealthy label was present (z = 3.64, p < .001). Compared with men who made a healthy choice, these men had significantly stronger gender stereotypes regarding food choices, believing that being health conscious was wimpy and not masculine and that real men did not worry about their food choices (t(240) = 2.37, p = .019).
There was also a significant three-way interaction between dining partner, gender, and surcharge condition (Wald c 2 (1) = 5.64, p = .018). When a surcharge was added, men who imagined eating alone significantly reduced demand for unhealthy food compared with a no intervention menu. In contrast, men who imagined eating with a male best friend did not significantly reduce demand when a surcharge was added. Women showed the opposite pattern. When eating alone, a surcharge did not significantly affect demand for unhealthy food compared with the no intervention condition; however, women who imagined eating with a female best friend significantly reduced demand when a surcharge was added. Consistent with our main hypothesis, adding an unhealthy surcharge continued to significantly reduce demand compared with no intervention for both men and women (men: z = -3.40, p = .001; women: z = -4.63, p < .001). Again, we used Herr (2013) to perform separate mediation analyses by gender. We found that fairness perceptions fully mediated the effect of an unhealthy surcharge on unhealthy food demand for men. For women, fairness perceptions partially mediated the effect of an unhealthy surcharge on unhealthy food demand. However, including both healthiness perceptions and fairness perceptions led to a full mediation on the effectiveness of an unhealthy surcharge on unhealthy food demand (for details, see the Web Appendix).
Discussion of Experiment 2
Our results demonstrate that regardless of whether a participant was asked to imagine dining alone or with a samesex friend, an unhealthy surcharge significantly reduced demand for unhealthy food. In addition, we again show that the degree to which men think that the price of unhealthy items is unfair relative to the price of healthy items mediates the choices they make. The transparency of the surcharge for unhealthy items results in perceptions of price unfairness for the unhealthy food and reduced choice of that food.
Food healthiness perceptions also play an important role in mediating women's choices. This increased role of healthiness perceptions for women is consistent across all the mediation analyses reported thus far.
In addition, we demonstrate that men eating alone are responsive to a surcharge, but this is not the case when they eat with other men (note that these results for men eating alone are consistent with the results of Experiments 1a and 1b for men, in which dining partner was not specified). Men also increased unhealthy food choice when an unhealthy label was added to the menu. This is consistent with research finding that the desire to avoid dissociative identities is magnified in public settings or in the presence of other men (Hopcroft 2006; White and Dahl 2006) . The unhealthy surcharge consistently reduced demand for unhealthy food across gender.
In Experiment 3, we use a real-world context to explore how food choice and consumption interact with our menu interventions and subsequent meal choice. We also explore the possibility of unintended substitution effects. People may order less unhealthy food with an unhealthy surcharge intervention but may increase unhealthy food consumption or even total food consumption. People may also decrease the proportion of unhealthy entrée items they order but may increase dessert or side orders. In Experiment 3, we aim to address these issues in a naturalistic setting.
EXPERIMENT 3: RESTAURANT FIELD EXPERIMENT
In Experiment 3, we investigate the effect of surcharges, unhealthy labels, and an unhealthy surcharge in a restaurant setting, where we could measure people's actual food consumption. Using a naturalistic environment also enables us 
PROPORTION OF UNHEALTHY ENTRÉE ITEMS ORDERED AS A FUNCTION OF MENU INTERVENTION AND DINING PARTNER, SPLIT BY GENDER (EXPERIMENT 2)
A: Men B: Women to further investigate how dining with a friend of the same sex or opposite sex and dining with a larger group could interact with the effectiveness of the menu interventions on unhealthy food choice and consumption. Finally, we use the field setting to investigate how the menu interventions affect both consumer attitudes toward the restaurant and firm revenue.
Materials and Design
We tested our hypotheses at a moderately priced restaurant in Durham, North Carolina, that was open from 4:00 P.M. to midnight, with the bulk of customers dining between 5:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. The restaurant specialized in small plates, which customers frequently share among fellow diners at their table. Unlike other studies in similar settings (e.g., Mishra, Mishra, and Masters 2012), we did not control for time of day because most patrons were eating dinner. Patrons seated themselves and ordered at the bar when making their food selections. The restaurant rotates its menu every month. The new entrée items (and corresponding prices) replaced the former entrées one by one during the four-day pilot-testing phase of the experiment. The experiment coincided with the first day of the new menu introduction, thus controlling for any familiarity or habitual entrée ordering because the menu was unfamiliar to all patrons.
Method
Over a 16-day span, we collected data on the menu orders of 464 tables composed of 1,063 people (62.9% female). Dining alone was infrequent (less than 5% of the tables). We created four daily menus, manipulating the price and whether certain items were listed as unhealthy. We ran the experiment from Monday to Thursday for four weeks, varying the menu each day and counterbalancing across days of the week. Depending on the day of the week, patrons were handed one of four menus (see Appendices B and C):
•The no intervention menu, which served as the control group; •The surcharge menu, which included a 15.5% price increase on the three most unhealthy entrée items (this increase was the highest the restaurant would implement); •The unhealthy label menu, which included an asterisk next to each unhealthy meal and an explanation at the bottom of the menu stating, "The marked items are above average for fat and/or sugar content in comparison to other entrée items"; and •The unhealthy surcharge menu, which included a 15.5% price increase, an asterisk next to each unhealthy meal, and an explanation at the bottom of the menu stating, "The marked items contain a 15.5% surcharge because they are above average for fat and/or sugar content in comparison to other entrée items." 2 We noted the number of patrons per table, the proportion of female patrons per table, and entrée choices; in addition, we measured the amount of food consumed at the table (in grams) by weighing each plate before serving and after the diners were finished. Upon receiving the bill for the meal, customers were given an opportunity to fill out a survey card, which asked how much they enjoyed their meal, how much they believed the restaurant was concerned with their health and well-being, and whether they would dine at this restaurant again. Customers were unaware of the menu interventions and, more generally, that they were part of a randomized experiment.
Results
Unhealthy entrée choice. Because people shared plates, we used the table as the unit of analysis, which ranged in size from 1 to 11 patrons. Figure 5 and Table 4 present the mean proportion of unhealthy dishes ordered per table for each menu.
Our first analysis used a chi-square test to examine whether the proportion of unhealthy dishes ordered per table varied as a function of the four menu conditions. The overall model was significant (c 2 (3) = 14.13, p = .003). Next, using a z-test of proportions, we demonstrated that compared with the no intervention menu, adding a surcharge did not significantly reduce the proportion of unhealthy entrées chosen. An unhealthy label significantly reduced the proportion who chose an unhealthy entrée compared with the no intervention condition, as did an unhealthy surcharge (though not significantly more than the unhealthy label). Thus, the field results were similar to the lab study results in that the unhealthy surcharge showed the smallest proportion of unhealthy entrée choices directionally; yet unlike in the lab studies, this proportion did not differ from that of the unhealthy label (z = .082, p = .928). As we show next, this result may be because most of the patrons were female.
The role of gender. A possible reason unhealthy labels were not significantly different from the unhealthy surcharge condition is due to the proportion of female patrons who dined at the restaurant (approximately 63% of the patrons were women). Figure 6 demonstrates the percentage 2 We revised the description of how the surcharge was implemented from the laboratory experiments to make it clear to customers that the tax was imposed on specific items and not because a daily value for fat and/or sugar had been exceeded. of unhealthy meals ordered per table as a function of the menu conditions and the gender composition per table. The overall model was significant (c 2 (9) = 42.41, p < .001). In addition, comparing regression models using only the main effects of the menu conditions versus the main effects of the menu conditions, proportion of female customers, and their interactions, we find that adding the gender composition significantly adds to the variance explained in the model (F add (4, 451) = 8.08, p < .001). Gender composition per table did not moderate the effect of a higher price alone or the unhealthy surcharge condition on the percentage of unhealthy entrée items ordered per table (p > .36). Similar to our previous findings, the gender composition of the table significantly interacted with the effectiveness of an unhealthy label on demand for unhealthy entrée items (t(451) = -4.24, p < .001). Tables with a higher proportion of men than women significantly increased the percentage of unhealthy entrée items ordered from a menu with an unhealthy label compared with tables that had an equal number of men and women (M more men = 59.9%, M equal = 30.7%; t(74) = 3.10, p = .003) or tables with more women (M more women = 15.7%; t(84) = 3.10, p < .001). In contrast, tables with a higher proportion of women significantly decreased the percentage of unhealthy entrée items ordered compared with tables with an equal number of men and women (t(108) = -2.33, p = .021). This result demonstrates that although an unhealthy label reduces unhealthy choice in some cases, it may actually have a backlash effect among men, who may view the unhealthy label as a positive identity signal. Thus, having an intervention that contains both a surcharge and an unhealthy label is most effective in significantly reducing demand for unhealthy food among men and women. As we have observed across all our studies, however, the reasons for its effectiveness may differ by gender, with men reacting against a price increase specifically linked to healthiness and women responding to the unhealthy label. In addition to gender, food and eating research has also focused on imitation and facilitation effects on food choice and consumption (e.g., Herman, Roth, and Polivy 2006) . Accordingly, we investigated the role of table size on the demand for unhealthy food. Neither the main effect of number of people nor the two-way interaction of number of people with menu condition was significantly related to the proportion of unhealthy entrée items chosen (p > .42).
Unhealthy food consumption. Although unhealthy food choice is an indirect measure of unhealthy food consumption, this setting enables us to examine actual food consumption. We measured the number of grams consumed by weighing the entrée plate before the item went to the customer and after the plate was taken away. We then took the total number of grams of unhealthy items divided by the 782 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2014 number of grams consumed overall (healthy and unhealthy) to get a percentage of unhealthy food consumed per table.
We examined determinants of unhealthy consumption by regressing surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge on the percentage of unhealthy grams consumed. The overall model was significant (F(3, 290) = 2.94, p = .033). The pattern was consistent with our experimental findings. Compared with the no intervention menu, neither an added surcharge nor an unhealthy label significantly decreased the percentage of unhealthy food consumed. The unhealthy surcharge intervention significantly reduced the percentage of unhealthy food consumed compared with the control group. Again, the unhealthy surcharge is only directionally better than the unhealthy label (t(131) = .513, p = .61), probably because of the greater number of female patrons.
Next, we investigated the potential moderating effects of the gender composition per table as well as table size on effectiveness of the menu interventions on percentage of unhealthy food consumption. We regressed the main effects of surcharge, unhealthy label, unhealthy surcharge, and proportion female as well as the two-way interactions of the proportion female per table with each of the menu interventions on percentage of unhealthy food consumption. The overall model was significant (F(7, 297) = 2.23, p = .03). The main effect of proportion female was not a significant predictor of the percentage of unhealthy food consumption (t(305) = .155, p = .88). The two-way interaction of proportion female and the unhealthy label menu intervention was marginally significant (t(305) = -1.88, p = .06). Probing the two-way interaction between the proportion of women per table and the unhealthy label menu condition, we regressed percentage of unhealthy food consumed as a function of the proportion of female customers per table when patrons just saw the unhealthy label menu intervention. The effect of the unhealthy label had contrasting effects when the proportion of men or women increased. Adding an unhealthy label significantly reduced the percentage of unhealthy food consumed when the proportion of women increased, but it significantly increased the percentage of unhealthy food consumed when the proportion of men increased (t(47) = 2.06, p = .045). Most importantly, the unhealthy surcharge intervention significantly reduced unhealthy consumption and was not significantly moderated by the gender composition of the table (p > .65).
We also tested whether table size influenced unhealthy food consumption. Neither the main effect of number of people nor any of the two-way interactions between number of people and any of the menu interventions were significant predictors of the percentage of unhealthy food consumed (p > .22).
Finally, we examined unintended substitution effects by testing whether adding a surcharge to some unhealthy items increases consumption of other higher-calorie items for which a surcharge was not added . Demand for side dishes and desserts, in terms of choice or amount of grams consumed, was not significantly affected by adding the surcharge, unhealthy label, or unhealthy surcharge (for details, see the Web Appendix).
Health and well-being perceptions. We analyzed diners' ratings of the restaurant's concern with health and wellbeing (1 = "not at all," and 5 = "very much so"). In cases in which multiple people at the table filled out a survey card, we took an average score of those that completed the postmeal survey per table and used it as a score for the table. We regressed the surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge menu conditions on diners' ratings of health and well-being. The overall model was significant (F(3, 290) = 19.47, p < .001). Replicating our previous results, the analysis showed that, compared with the control group, adding a surcharge did not significantly influence diners' ratings of the restaurant's concern for health and well-being. By contrast, an unhealthy label significantly increased health and well-being ratings, as did the unhealthy surcharge (though not significantly more than the unhealthy label alone).
Meal enjoyment ratings. We measured meal enjoyment on a five-point Likert scale (1 = "not at all," and 5 = "very much"). Again, we took the average score of those who completed the postmeal survey and used this score for the table. We analyzed diners' ratings of enjoyment of the meal using a regression analysis in which we again regressed the surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge menu conditions on ratings of meal enjoyment. The overall model was not statistically significant (F(3, 291) = 2.06, p = .106).
Likelihood of dining in the restaurant again. We used a logistic regression analysis, regressing the surcharge, unhealthy label, and unhealthy surcharge on whether consumers would dine at the restaurant again. The overall model was statistically significant (c 2 (3) = 11.22, p = .011). Adding a surcharge and adding an unhealthy surcharge significantly increased the likelihood to dine again, whereas having just an unhealthy label did not significantly influence likelihood ratings as compared with the no intervention condition.
Discussion of the Restaurant Field Experiment
Experiment 3 provides important evidence about the generality of our results in a field setting where diners make actual food consumption choices. Replicating our previous results, the unhealthy surcharge reduced the choice of an unhealthy entrée (although in this experiment it was only directionally better than the unhealthy label alone). The unhealthy surcharge also led to a reduction in the percentage of unhealthy food consumed (directionally better than the unhealthy label alone). Like our other studies, Experiment 3 showed significant gender effects. In particular, the gender composition of the table significantly influenced the effectiveness of the unhealthy label. The proportion of unhealthy food items chosen increased as the percentage of men per table increased. This result implies that an unhealthy label alone can significantly backfire in restaurants that have a higher proportion of male customers (e.g., a sports bar). In contrast, the unhealthy surcharge intervention reduced unhealthy food selection and consumption regardless of gender.
Finally, we showed that the unhealthy surcharge did not lower but rather increased meal enjoyment and likelihood of returning to the restaurant. Notably, the unhealthy surcharge typically improved perceptions of the restaurant's concern with diner health and well-being. Our findings from Experiment 2 show that an unhealthy surcharge increases unfairness perceptions, so at first glance this result may seem inconsistent. However, people may be able to separate feelings of price unfairness from a restaurant's interest in the well-being of its customers, which may be influenced by perceived transparency in revealing the healthiness of menu items as well as by judgments of price fairness. We also measured firm revenue as a function of the menu type (for details, see the Web Appendix). Our results imply that if unhealthy items are the more expensive items at the restaurant, firm revenue is likely to decrease as a function of the unhealthy surcharge. However, if healthier entrée items are the more expensive items, there is the potential that firm profitability may increase as a function of an unhealthy label or unhealthy surcharge intervention.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our research demonstrates that single interventions such as surcharges, unhealthy labels, or health information are not sufficient to curtail demand for unhealthy food. Instead, surcharges need to be combined with an unhealthy label (an unhealthy surcharge), which informs consumers that the surcharge is due to the unhealthy nature of the menu item.
Why Is the Unhealthy Surcharge Intervention Effective?
Across all our studies, the unhealthy surcharge intervention was either as effective or more effective than the surcharge and unhealthy label interventions. Why is this the case? In general, the surcharge condition is effective for men when they are dining alone but not when dining with others. The unhealthy label is effective in reducing choice of unhealthy food for women but can be ineffective or backfire for men. The unhealthy surcharge makes the price increase explicit and frames it as a penalty for choosing unhealthy food. Thus, the unhealthy surcharge condition may be effective overall because different features of the intervention are effective for each gender. The explicit price increase for unhealthy food may decrease consumption of such food for men, whereas women may be more affected by the unhealthy label. Thus, the combined intervention is effective because it is able to encourage both men and women to make healthy choices. The mediation analyses also support this idea. Price fairness consistently plays an important role for men in mediating the effects of menu condition; for women, healthiness perceptions consistently play a role as well, with price fairness mattering somewhat less.
Is tax aversion alone a sufficient account of our findings? Sussman and Olivola (2011) argue that people have an aversion to taxes that can alter preferences disproportionately compared with the actual financial cost. Moreover, taxes are perceived as a moral transgression and loss of financial freedom, driving notions of unfairness (Kirchler 2007) . To test whether simply framing a price increase as a tax versus a price change itself could account for these effects, we used a z-test of proportions of unhealthy food demand between the higher price menu and the unhealthy surcharge menu for Experiments 1a and 2. In these menus, the prices were identical, but in the combined unhealthy label plus surcharge condition, an asterisk indicated that part of the price was because of an unhealthy surcharge. Thus, we believed that a contrast between the higher price and combined unhealthy surcharge menu provided a reasonable test of the notion that announcing that part of the price was driven by a tax would reduce choice even in the absence of a price increase. In Experiment 1a, the combined unhealthy surcharge condition significantly reduced the proportion selecting an unhealthy entrée item (z = -3.54, p < .00). In Experiment 2, the combined unhealthy surcharge condition significantly reduced the proportion selecting an unhealthy entrée item (z = -4.90, p < .001). Thus, we do not believe that tax aversion alone can explain our results. These analyses demonstrate that although our results may partly be due to tax aversion, the key driver is coupling the disincentive with an evaluative label. These results, however, point out that further research is needed to examine the success of the unhealthy surcharge condition in more detail. We believe that gender differences will be an important piece of that account.
Implications for Research on Food Choice
Our work shows that a food surcharge of a magnitude currently being considered for policy experts may not be sufficiently aversive on its own. Indeed, recent work by Ellison, Lusk, and Davis (2014) supports this notion, finding that menu labeling outperformed a 10% price increase or decrease at reducing caloric intake. Why is this? We believe consumers may have inferred a variety of reasons for the price increase and this ambiguity may have undermined the persuasiveness of the surcharge. By contrast, when the price increase is attributed to a particular reason, even if evidence is provided that might justify that reason, consumers may not judge the price increase to be fair. Our research suggests that linking the increase to unhealthy items focuses attention on the reason for the price increase and whether this increase is fair. In particular, by clearly indicating the health-related reason for the price increase, people (especially men) curtailed unhealthy choice because they felt that the price of the unhealthy goods was unfair.
Our research also contributes to the understanding of how gender and gender stereotypes affect preferences for unhealthy and healthy food. When the social impact of a choice is more strongly felt (i.e., by making gender salient or dining in a social setting), an unhealthy label may lead people to make choices consistent with those stereotypes. Men eating with other men will increase unhealthy choice and consumption, whereas women eating with other women will increase healthy choice and consumption. However, coupling the unhealthy label with a price surcharge enables people to react not only to stereotypes associated with eating behavior but also to the perceived fairness associated with imposing a surcharge on just unhealthy items. Our mediation analyses show that the roles of price fairness and healthiness perceptions vary by gender, with healthiness perceptions playing a greater role for women than for men and vice versa for price fairness. More research is needed on factors affecting the relative role of these two perceptions.
Our research also demonstrates that people's choices may vary considerably depending on with whom they are dining. More research is needed to examine how specific characteristics of a person's dining companions (e.g., number, gender, relationship closeness and type [romantic or platonic]) affect how successful various interventions are in curtailing unhealthy eating.
Implications for Marketers and Managers
Marketers and managers stand to benefit from understanding how financial disincentives and unhealthy labels influence consumer behavior and consumer perception of the firm. On the firm side, we demonstrate that, in general, adding an unhealthy label increases ratings of how concerned the firm is with the health and well-being of its customers, whereas enjoyment and likelihood to dine at the restaurant remain unaffected across menu conditions. This result is counter to current practices of earmarking healthy choices or lower-calorie menus at restaurants instead of earmarking unhealthy items. One potential explanation for this result is that increasing the transparency of negative information may be an indicator of the firm's trustworthiness for the consumer. Firms that are more transparent and communicate effectively with their customer base (e.g., by informing them which items are unhealthy) are likely to increase levels of customer trust. Increasing customer trust may lead to several long-term gains, such as higher customer loyalty, greater commitment, and more service usage (Maltz and Kohli 1996) . Another promising finding for the firm is that despite making the inclusion of a price hike due to a meal being unhealthy more salient to consumers, diners' ratings of meal enjoyment and likelihood to return remained unaffected across conditions.
Implications for Policy
Our results provide guidelines for policy makers who are considering the use of behavioral economics and social marketing to enhance individual and collective well-being. Our price surcharge intervention contributes to the debate on financial (dis)incentives to (decrease) increase demand. Moreover, providing a label for unhealthy food is consistent with a social marketing approach. If the goal is to reduce demand for unhealthy products, the most effective method across our studies was an unhealthy surcharge approach, which highlights both the financial disincentive and unhealthy food label. Our findings show that an unhealthy surcharge more effectively reduces unhealthy food choices than laws requiring calorie information on menu items. We recommend that countries with strong behavioral economics and social marketing programs, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Bangladesh, add this innovative intervention to their tool kit. Future researchers could examine cost-benefit analyses of an unhealthy surcharge in the context of country health goals to reduce obesity and obesity-related health costs.
Policy makers would need to consider several issues to implement an unhealthy surcharge. For example, should it be the law or merely a recommendation to all vendors of prepared foods? Should such a recommendation be for restaurants only or for suppliers of prepared packaged foods as well? How will (non)compliance be communicated to consumers? Finally, how does the level of surcharge compare with the tax on other unhealthy items? While answering these questions, it is important to remember that governments are likely to face resistance from businesses that may lose profits from lower demand for higher-priced unhealthy menu items. Our results (in the Web Appendix) indicate that losses in profit/item may be compensated by increased loyalty to the restaurant due to a sense of its greater concern for customers. One way to meet profit and health goals might be to encourage customers to select at least one healthy item to get a price break. Another option would be to implement the unhealthy surcharge for a short period (e.g., three months) to help consumers break unhealthy eating habits. This strategy is similar to short-term incentives to encourage smokers to quit smoking cigarettes.
In addition, it would be important to extend this research into other domains to determine the boundary conditions for when people are sensitive to price increase transparency and when they are sensitive to just price increases alone. One important boundary condition is cultural reactions to government interference. For example, what would be the consumer reaction to a government-recommended surcharge (e.g., 5%) on unhealthy food? Additional research is required to assess whether consumer demand would increase due to backlash regardless of perceptions of price unfairness. For example, would consumers be less likely to reduce demand if they were informed that the revenue collected from the surcharge was going to help school nutrition education versus used to pay the medical expenses of obese people? Prior research has demonstrated that reactance to a surcharge may also manifest itself by increasing negative attitudes toward the government and increasing the propensity to avoid or evade taxes in general (Kirchler 1998) . Therefore, from a policy standpoint, further research should also consider the long-term and compensatory reactions to a surcharge on unhealthy food.
